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by
Professor Phillip E. Norvell 
University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville)
I.  The Problem of Unplugged Oil and Gas Wells
A. Physical waste of oil, gas and coal reserves.
The failure to properly plug an abandoned oil or gas 
well may result in actual physical waste of oil and gas 
reserves because of the following: water may migrate 
from the unplugged well to the producing formation and 
"flood out" producing wells or force migration of oil 
and gas into nonproductive areas; and, gas may 
dissipate into the air from the wellhead, i.e., 
purging, which may reduce the reservoir pressure and 
result in less than maximum ultimate recovery from the 
reservoir. See, Forbes v. United States, 125 F. 2d 404 
(9th Cir. 1942). Migration of oil, gas or water from 
an unplugged well into coal seams may interfere with or 
prevent mining of coal reserves. Mine shafts may be 
flooded by salt water or invaded by migrating gas which 
may result in injury to miners as well as physical 
waste of coal reserves.
B. Groundwater pollution.
Salt water originating in the unplugged well bore may 
migrate up the hole and contaminate fresh water 
formations. Such salt water intrusion into fresh water 
formations is typically a result of pressurization of 
the formation penetrated by the unplugged well due to 
salt water disposal or waterflood operations.
C. Surface damage.
The purging of salt water or oil from the unplugged 
well may damage the soil, crops, livestock and 
improvements. See, Annotation, Liability for Injury to 
Property Occasioned by Oil, Water or the Like, Flowing 
from Well, 19 A.L.R. 2d 1025 (1951).
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D. Personal injury.
Gas purging from an unplugged well may cause personal 
injury. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Witcher. 141 Okla. 
175, 284 P. 297 (1929). Toxic substances sometimes 
found in oil and gas reserves, such as H2S, may result 
in death.
II. The Statutory Requirement to Plug Abandoned Wells
A.  "Requirement that Dry or Abandoned Wells be Plugged, " 
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-215 (1987), reads as follows:
1. "Each abandoned well and each dry hole promptly 
shall be plugged in the manner and within the time 
required by regulations to be prescribed by the 
commission. The owner of the well shall give 
notice, upon a form the commission may prescribe, 
of the drilling of each dry hole and of the 
owner's intention to abandon. "
2. "No well shall be abandoned until the notice has 
been given and no fee shall be required to be paid 
with this notice. "
B.  "Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Another, " Ark. Code 
Ann. § 15-72-218 (1987), is a "self help" provision, 
inter alia. which prescribes the following:
"Any person" injured or threatened with injury by the 
failure of a well to be plugged in compliance with § 
15-72-217, infra, may, after proper notice, enter upon 
the premises, plug the well and recover the costs of 
plugging, court costs and attorney's fees from the 
person with the "duty to plug the well." The act also 
impresses a lien upon the well equipment and leasehold 
interest of the owner or operator of the well to ensure 
recovery of the statutory damages.
C.  The method of plugging a "dry" or "abandoned" well in 
which "oil or gas bearing stratum" has been found, to 
be supervised by an "Oil and Gas Inspector" is 
prescribed by Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-217 (1987), 
"Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Lessee or Operator," 
which, in relevant part, reads as follows:
1.  Beginning at the bottom, the hole shall be solidly 
plugged with a substance *** of one-third (1/3)
*** cement and two-thirds (2/3) *** of sand 
properly mixed with water to a point twenty-five
2
feet (25') above top level of the oil or gas 
bearing sand. At that point, a seasoned wooden 
plug two feet (2') in length and the diameter of 
the hole shall be placed. Thereafter the hole 
shall be filled solidly with twenty-five (25') of 
sand balings. Then a seasoned wooden plug two 
feet (2') long, and the diameter of the hole shall 
be placed and driven firmly into the sand balings.
2. Should there be more than one (1) oil or gas
bearing sand *** after plugging the bottom sand in 
the well *** the well shall be filled with sand 
balings within ten feet (10') of the bottom of the 
next sand *** when this sand and each succeeding 
sand shall be plugged in the manner set out in 
subdivision (1) *** until all of the oil and gas 
bearing sands in the well have been plugged ***.
III.  The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission Regulations Governing 
Well Plugging.
A.  Statutory basis for the Commission's jurisdiction.
1. Rule making authority for well plugging.
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-71-110(c)(1)(A) (1987)
authorizes the Commission to promulgate reasonable 
rules to, inter alia, require the plugging of 
wells in a manner which avoids the migration of 
oil or gas from one strata to another, the 
intrusion of water into an oil or gas stratum, and 
the pollution of freshwater supplies by oil, gas 
or salt water.
2. Bond requirement authority.
Ark. Code Ann § 15-71-110(c)(1)(B) (1987)
authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules that 
require a bond to secure the plugging of each 
"dry" or "abandoned" well.
B.  Well plugging regulations of the Commission.
1. Duty to protect oil, gas and water.
Rule B-6 requires that before any well, or any 
producing formation therein, shall be abandoned 
the "owner or operator" shall use the "means, 
methods and procedure (sic)" necessary to prevent 
water encroachment in any oil or gas bearing
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formation and to prevent waste or contamination to 
any underground or surface water "suitable for 
domestic or irrigation purposes."
2.  Notice of abandonment and Commission supervision 
of the well plugging.
Rule B-7 requires that an "Application to Abandon" 
be filed with the Commission for any well to be 
abandoned that was drilled in "search of oil or 
gas. " The application specifies the time and 
place of plugging. Upon receipt of the 
application, the Commission is to issue a 
"Plugging Permit" and send a representative to 
supervise the operation.
Rule B-5 (5) requires the application to abandon 
to be filed within 5 days of the actual completion 
of the well, or within 5 days of the filing of the 
requisite Well Completion Report. Rule B-7 also 
requires the plugging operation to be performed 
prior to the time the equipment used to drill the 
well is released from the well site.
Rule B-9 requires an affidavit to be filed with 
 the Commission within five (5) days of the 
completion of the plugging operation which 
describes in "detail" the method used to plug the 
well.
3.  "Plugging Methods and Procedure" Rule B-8.
Rule B-8 specifies the manner in which the well 
is to be plugged. Essentially, each producing 
formation, and all water bearing strata, as well 
as the surface hole, must be effectively sealed. 
More specifically, Rule B-8 (A) requires filling 
the bottom hole to the top of the deepest 
producing formation, and placing a cement plug 
(not less than 100' in length) or a bridge plug 
inside the casing immediately above each producing 
stratum. Section (B) requires that a cement plug 
be placed inside the base of the surface casing 
when such surface casing has been cemented below 
the base of the freshwater formation as required 
by Rule B-15. When surface casing has not been 
cemented below the freshwater sands, a cement plug 
must be placed approximately fifty feet (50') 
below all such freshwater strata. Section (C) 
requires the placing of a plug at the surface in 
such a manner that it will not interfere with
4
cultivation. Section (D) requires that the 
intervals between plugs be filled with an approved 
heavy mud-laden fluid.
Section (E) provides that, in addition to the
surface plug, an uncased well drilled by a 
rotary rig shall be plugged with a cement plug 
placed immediately above the smackover limestone 
zone, and any other known productive zone in the 
area, with the hole filled with heavy mud up to 
the base of the surface casing where a cement plug 
is to be placed. However, if the surface casing 
is not cemented through the base of the fresh 
water stratum, a cement plug is to be placed fifty 
feet (50') below the fresh water strata.
Finally, section (F) provides any method of 
plugging other than the prescribed methods may be 
used if approved by the Commission.
4.  Permit and bonding requirements for casing pullers 
and salvage operators.
Rule B-12 requires a permit and a $5000 surety 
bond for anyone engaged in pulling casing for 
compensation or purchasing abandoned wells with 
the intent to salvage the casing. Failure to 
plug a well from which the casing has been pulled 
without compliance with the well plugging rules 
results in the forfeiture of the bond. The permit 
may be issued for a term of not less than one (1) 
year, nor more than three (3) years, with the bond 
being co-extensive with the term. The permit is 
also non-transferable. A willful violation of 
Rule B-12 incurs a penalty not to exceed $1000 a 
day for each day of violation.
IV.  Securing Statutory Compliance: The Affidavit of Financial 
Responsibility, Surety Bond and Civil Penalties
A.  Proof of financial responsibility.
Rule B-2 requires an applicant for a drilling permit to 
submit an affidavit of financial responsibility, 
subscribed under oath, stating that the applicant owns 
within the State of Arkansas assets in excess of 
liabilities sufficient to enable compliance with the 
surface owner damage protection act, Ark. Code Ann. § 
15-72-213 (1987), (being more commonly known as Act 902 
of 1983).
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The surface owner protection act, inter alia, impresses 
a lien on the well equipment and production runs of the 
operator to secure payment of damages for surface 
injury occasioned by operator neglect. The surface 
owner must give written notice to the Commission of the 
surface damage claim within one (1) year of the 
issuance of the drilling permit. The surface owner's 
lien is also expressly subordinated to the right of the 
Commission to secure compliance with the well plugging 
act, Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), under the proof 
of financial responsibility.
B.  The surety bond or letter of credit.
I n lieu of the affidavit of financial responsibility, 
Rule B-2 permits the applicant for a drilling permit to 
post a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit 
in the sum of $15,000 to ensure compliance with the 
surface owner protection act, Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72- 
213 (1987). The bond or letter of credit remains in 
effect until the requirements of the surface owner 
protection act have been satisfied. Typically, if 
surface owner claims are not filed within the requisite 
one (1) year period, the surety bond or letter of 
credit is canceled by the Director of Production and 
Conservation and the operator then furnishes the 
affidavit of financial responsibility.
C. Assumption of liability by successor operator.
Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-204 (1987) and, 
also, Rule B-2(a), proof of financial responsibility is 
only required as a condition to the issuance of the 
drilling permit. Thus, the operator who acquires an 
existing well by assignment is not required to furnish 
proof of financial responsibility. Legislation has 
been proposed in this legislative session to amend Ark. 
Code Ann. § 15-72-213 to require a successor operator 
of any existing well to furnish proof of financial 
responsibility.
D. Bonding of pre-existing wells: wells drilled prior to 
the bonding requirement.
The Arkansas Oil and Gas Conservation Act, (commonly 
referred to as Act 105 of 1939), which authorized the 
newly created Oil and Gas Commission to promulgate 
rules governing well plugging, including a bonding 
provision, Arkansas Acts 105 of 1939, Sec. 11, was 
enacted in 1939. Presumably, some wells drilled prior
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to that date are still in operation. The operator of 
any such "pre-existing well" is not required to furnish 
proof of financial responsibility. Thus, "pre-existing 
wells," destined only to be abandoned, will remain free 
of the proof of financial responsibility requirements, 
denying the state the benefit of the security to 
facilitate proper plugging. In contrast, the Illinois 
Oil and Gas Act, 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 96 1/2 para. 5409, 
by amendment, 1945 111. Laws para. 1091, § 1, requires 
"each manager or operator who has acquired or may 
hereafter acquire any well drilled for these purposes 
which has not theretofore been plugged and abandoned" 
to post the usual proof of financial responsibility.
E.  Civil penalties.
1. A fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1000 
for any violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-217 
(1987), "Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Lessee 
or Operator. " Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-202(a)(1) 
(1987).
2. A fine of not more than $2500 a day for each
violation may be incurred for violation of any 
Commission rule, including rule B-8, infra, which 
prescribes the method of plugging abandoned wells. 
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-103(a) (1987).
V.  The Liability of the Operator to the State 
A. Liability on the requisite security.
1. The affidavit of financial responsibility.
Most state conservation statutes require 
performance bonds as the sole method of securing 
compliance with the well plugging obligation.
Thus, no reported case has been found which 
analyzes the rights of the conservation agency 
pursuing the assets of an operator pursuant to the 
affidavit of financial responsibility for failure 
to comply with the plugging operation.
The surety bond cases, discussed below at V (A)
(2) et seq., may indicate a willingness of the 
courts to liberally construe the rights, if any, 
of the agency pursuant to the affidavit of 
financial responsibility.
2. The state is not required to prove damage in a 
suit on the bond.
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In People ex re. Schull v. Massachusetts Bonding & 
Ins. Co.. 4 I11.2d 23, 122 N.E. 2d 185, 4 0. &.
G.R. 126 (1954), the defendant surety executed a 
bond which was conditioned upon the principal 
complying with the oil and gas conservation act, 
which required restoration of the well site to its 
pre-drilling condition. The principal failed to 
restore the surface and the Department of Mines 
and Minerals (department) sued the defendant 
surety on the bond. After the complaint was 
filed, the defendant, at its own expense, had the 
surface restored to the satisfaction of the 
department. The defendant then argued that the 
department could not recover on the bond in the 
absence of any injury occasioned by the breach of 
the condition of the bond. The trial court 
rejected the defendant's argument and entered 
judgment for the Department for the full amount of 
the bond. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the 
trial court's judgment on appeal, holding that the 
bond was a "penalty bond," intended to secure 
compliance with the law, as opposed to an 
"indemnity bond," intended to indemnify the state 
for damages sustained due to the violation of the 
statute. The court observed that to construe the 
bond as an "indemnity bond, " i. e., limiting the 
surety's obligation to actual damages sustained by 
the public body, would frustrate the statutory 
purpose and reduce the requirement of a bond to an 
"empty formality. " Contra State v. Alpha Oil & 
Gas, Inc.. 747 S.W. 2d 378 (Tx. 1988).
3.  Operator's liability to surety for the amount of 
the bond in the event of forfeiture.
The contract of indemnity provides that the 
principal, the operator, will indemnify the surety 
for any losses sustained by the latter when the 
bond is forfeited due to the failure of the former 
to comply with the statute. See generally, State 
v. Duchscherer. 35 A.D. 2d 7, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 45, 36 
0. & G.R. 79 (1970).
B. Right of conservation agency to plug the well and sue 
the operator for the costs.
Some oil and gas conservation acts provide that the 
state may enter the land and plug the well and charge 
the costs to the operator. Section 75 (1)(C) of the 
New York Conservation Act provides as follows:
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*** the department shall have the power to: (K) 
Enter, take temporary possession of any abandoned 
well, and plug the same as provided in its 
plugging rules and regulations, whenever any 
operator shall neglect or refuse to comply with 
such rules and regulations. Such plugging by the 
department shall be at the expense of the operator 
whose duty it shall be to plug the well.
For application of the statute, see generally, State v. 
Duchscherer. 35 A. D. 2d 7, 312 N. Y. S. 2d 45, 36 0. &.
G.R. 79 (1970).
C.  Right of the state to compel the operator to replug an 
improperly plugged well.
Although the Arkansas plugging act and Commission 
regulations do not specifically provide that the 
Commission may compel the operator to replug an 
improperly plugged well, authority for that 
proposition exists. In Currey v. Corporation Comm'n, 
617 P. 2d 177, 68 0. &. G. R. 274 (Okla. 1979), two wells 
which had been abandoned and plugged by the operator, 
the defendant, in the mid-1950's were discovered twenty 
(20) years later to be purging salt water onto the 
surface at the rate of forty (40) barrels per day.
The Corporation Commission determined that the wells 
had been improperly plugged and ordered the defendant 
to replug the wells. Although the Oklahoma well 
plugging statute did not specifically authorize the 
Commission to compel the operator to subsequently 
replug an improperly plugged well, the court, relying 
upon an amendment establishing the "orphan" well 
plugging fund which made reference to "replugging or 
repairing the well *** to prevent further pollution, " 
held that the Commission had such authority. 
Subsequently, in Ashland Oil. Inc, v. Corporation 
Comm'n . 595 P. 2d 423, 63 0. &. G. R. 331 (Okla. 1979), 
the operator plugged two wells in 1946 and 1959, 
respectively, in violation of the Commission's rules to 
protect groundwater by failing to set a cement plug 
below the fresh water strata. However, the Commission's 
inspectors who supervised the plugging of the wells had 
approved the defendant's plugging procedure.
Thereafter, in the 1970's, the wells were purging salt 
water and polluting a freshwater formation which was 
used for a domestic water supply. The court affirmed 
an order of the Commission requiring the defendant to 
replug the wells. In so doing, the court concluded 
that the Commission had no authority to waive the 
applicable regulations and, thus, was not bound by the 
ultra vires action of their employees. Likewise, the
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Commission was not estopped from requiring replugging 
of the wells in compliance with the rules. Finally, 
the failure to have yet ordered other operators in the 
area with identically plugged wells to replug their 
wells did not render the Commission's order arbitrary 
and unenforceable.
D. Liability to the state is incurred when environmental 
harm or physical waste of minerals occurs even though 
 the operator has complied with the well plugging act.
In State v. Duchscherer. 35 A.D. 2d 7, 312 N. Y. S. 2d 45, 
36 O. &. G.R. 79 (1970), the defendant operator plugged 
and abandoned several unprofitable wells. After the 
initial plugging efforts, three (3) of the wells 
continued to purge gas. After making several 
unsuccessful attempts to seal the leaks by replugging 
the wells, the defendant "gave up, " declining to 
undertake any more replugging efforts. The wells 
continued to leak gas. Pursuant to the statute, Sec.
75 (C) of the Conservation Act, the Conservation 
Department engaged a contractor who replugged the wells 
and then sued the defendant to recover the costs. In 
the suit, the defendant argued, inter alia. that, 
following accepted procedures, he had plugged and 
subsequently replugged the wells in strict compliance 
with the Department's regulations and, thus, had 
fulfilled his responsibility under the plugging act.
The Court of Appeals, affirming the lower court's 
judgment for the Department, rejected the defendant's 
defense, holding that the defendant's responsibility 
under the statute was not merely to follow the 
Department's regulations but to plug the well to 
prevent the escape of gas. The court emphasized the 
plugging statute, i.e., "the legislative safeguard 
against environmental pollution and destructive and 
dangerous gas blowouts and fires, "must be strictly 
enforced.
VI. Liability of the Operator to Third Parties
A. Violation of the well plugging acts.
1. Abandonment of the well.
The Arkansas Well Plugging Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 
15-72-216(a) (1987), requires each "abandoned
well" and "dry hole" to be plugged pursuant to 
Rule B-6 after notice of the intent to abandon, 
which is a condition precedent to abandonment, is 
given to the Commission. However, neither the 
statutes, nor the rules of the Commission define
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an "abandoned well." The problem of definition is 
generally encountered when a well is non­
producing, or incapable of being completed as a 
producing well, but the operator refuses to plug 
the well, alleging that it has not been 
"abandoned, "but only ostensibly "temporarily 
shut-in" or "awaiting other completion efforts."
Seaboard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth. 237 S. W. 48 (Ky. 
Ct. Ap. 1922), is the leading case on abandonment. 
There the defendant was fined $300 in the Circuit 
Court for failure to comply with the Kentucky Well 
Plugging Act, a predecessor statute to Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 353. 180. The evidence indicated that 
the defendant operator had drilled a well on the 
lease premises which showed a meager trace of oil 
in the well bore. The defendant did not then test 
the well's productivity by pumping but delayed the 
test until other wells projected to be drilled on 
the lease in the future could be tested. 
Apparently, the defendant was motivated to run the 
pumping test at the same time on all the wells to 
be drilled on the premises so that the same power 
source could be utilized. However, the defendant 
was waiting on the results of other wells being 
drilled on adjacent tracts before deciding whether 
to further drill, or, if so, where to drill on the 
lease premises. In any event, the defendant did 
not complete the well as a producer or pull the 
casing. Also, the defendant moved the drilling 
rig from the lease. On appeal of the fine, the 
defendant argued, inter alia, that the failure to 
pull the casing precluded a finding of abandonment 
of the well, which was a prerequisite to 
imposition of the fine. The court affirmed the 
conviction. In so doing, it adopted an objective 
standard of abandonment, i.e., evidence of an act 
of abandonment with the intention to abandon, 
inferred from the circumstances surrounding the 
events, including the conduct of the parties, 
regardless of the claimed mental intent of the 
operator. The court also noted that abandonment 
was a question of fact for the jury. Further, the 
court opined that pulling the casing would 
constitute ipso facto abandonment, i.e., 
abandonment as a matter of law.
Applying the common law standard of abandonment, 
i.e., an act plus intent of abandonment, as a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury in a 
judicial proceeding, is an inefficient, haphazard
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manner of enforcing the proper plugging of dry 
holes and depleted or uneconomic oil and gas 
wells. Administratively determined criteria which 
specifically delineates the circumstances under 
which nonproducing wells may be temporarily shut- 
in or permanently plugged provides the operator 
with more certainty as to its rights and 
obligations and provides the public with more 
protection of natural resources and the 
environment.
Some conservation acts do definitively define 
"abandoned well" for purposes of the well plugging 
acts and agency regulations. For example, Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353. 510 (12) defines "abandoned 
well" as one which has "never been used, or which, 
in the opinion of the department (conservation 
agency), will no longer be used for the production 
of oil or gas, or for the injection or disposal of 
fluid therein."
2. Failure to comply with the well plugging acts is 
negligence per se.
In Nisbet v. Van Tuy l  224 F. 2d 66, 51 0. &. G.R. 
15 (7th. Cir. 1955), the defendant, the assignee 
of the lessee of the oil and gas lease, drilled a 
dry hole through a workable coal seam. The 
defendant allegedly failed to properly plug the 
well pursuant to the Kentucky well plugging act, 
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353. 120. Subsequently, the 
plaintiff, the lessor, executed a coal lease on 
the land to the West Kentucky Coal Company. When 
the coal company started mining the coal, water 
and gas from the abandoned well leaked into the 
mine, halting the mining operations. Plaintiffs, 
at a cost of $7500, properly replugged the 
abandoned well so that the coal mining operations 
could be resumed. Then, alleging negligence in 
the failure to properly plug the abandoned well 
pursuant to the statute, plaintiffs sued the 
defendant to recover the replugging costs. In 
reversing the trial court’s granting of summary 
judgment to the defendant, the Circuit Court of 
Appeals held, inter alia, that violation of the 
statute was "negligence per se.” Thus, to 
recover, plaintiff needed to prove only that the 
defendant's violation of the statute was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage. 
Additionally, the court held that the Kentucky 
statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353. 990, providing
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criminal and civil penalties for violation of the 
act, did not preclude the existence of the private 
cause of action for violation of the statute.
3. Proximate cause of injury may be established by 
circumstantial evidence.
In Palmer Corp. v. Collins. 284 S. W. 97 (Ky.
1926), plaintiff owned an oil and gas lease 
adjacent to the defendant's lease. The defendant 
abandoned, without plugging, two wells on his 
lease in conformity with the well plugging act. 
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff, whose wells had 
not previously produced water, discovered water in 
his battery tanks. Plaintiff examined the 
defendant's two unplugged wells and discovered 
that they were "open and full of water. "
Plaintiff informed the defendant who agreed to 
plug the wells but was prevented from doing so for 
two (2) months due to lack of equipment. After 
the defendant's wells were properly plugged and 
the water had been removed from the wells, the 
water did not reappear in plaintiff's wells. 
Plaintiff sued the defendant for the costs of 
removing the water from his wells. The Court of 
Appeals sustained the trial court's judgment in 
favor of plaintiff. In so doing, the court held, 
inter alia, that direct proof that the water in 
the plaintiff's wells was due to the defendant's 
failure to properly plug his well was not 
required. The fact that the plaintiff had no 
trouble with water in his wells prior to the 
defendant's failure to properly plug his abandoned 
wells, and when the defendant's wells were 
properly plugged and the water was removed from 
plaintiff's wells, the water did not return was 
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict for the 
plaintiff.
In McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 233 Kan. 
252, 662 P. 2d 1203, 77 O. & G.R. 241 (1983), the 
following circumstantial evidence was found 
sufficient to avoid summary judgment for the 
defendant oil companies and to go to the jury on 
the issue of liability for groundwater pollution 
pursuant to a statute imposing liability for 
damages incurred by escape of salt water in oil 
and gas operations: evidence that a water well on
plaintiff's land produced good water when he 
purchased the tract in 1967; that subsequent water 
well drilled in 1970 developed "extremely high 
chloride and salt content" and was unfit for use
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in 1974; various witnesses' testimony that 
numerous salt water disposal pits existed and that 
salt water surface spills, oil tank and pipeline 
leaks were prevalent in oil company operations in 
the geographic area; and, expert witnesses, 
including a hydrologist, who testified that 
plaintiff's well appeared to be polluted by oil 
field brine. None of the witnesses testified as 
to any act of the defendants which caused the 
pollution of the plaintiff's well; no evidence of 
direct causal connection was introduced.
4. The well plugging act protects landowners, 
adjacent landowners and mining operators.
The general well plugging act in Arkansas, Ark. 
Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), does not expressly 
impose liability in favor of a party who suffers 
harm attributable to a violation of the act. Ark. 
Code Ann. § 15-72-218 (1987) permits "any person 
injured or threatened with injury" the remedy of 
self-help, i.e., the right to plug the well and 
recover the costs of plugging, as well as court 
costs and attorney fees, from the "person whose 
duty it was to plug the well." However, the 
limitation on liability in § 15-72-216, as well as 
the limitation on damages in § 15-72-218 appears 
to be inconsequential. In addition to holding that 
violation of the statute constitutes negligence 
per se. Nisbet v. Van Tuyl. supra, the courts have 
extended protection of the well plugging act to 
landowners and adjacent landowners and oil and gas 
or mining operators who have been damaged by the 
defendant's failure to properly plug an abandoned 
well. Likewise, damages are awarded for all 
pecuniary losses proximately caused by the 
defendant's failure to properly plug the well.
The following cases illustrate the scope of 
protection of the well plugging acts and the 
damages which may be awarded pursuant thereto:
a. Groundwater pollution or surface damage.
Hall v. Galey, 271P. 319 (Kan. 1928), 
illustrates, in part, the traditional theory 
of damages for groundwater pollution. There, 
the defendant operator negligently plugged an 
abandoned gas well in violation of the Kansas
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well plugging act. As a result, subsurface 
salt water polluted a water well on land 
situated adjacent to the well. Plaintiff, 
the landowner, recovered the diminution in 
the market value of the land due to the 
"permanent" harm occasioned to the 
groundwater, the only source of potable water 
on the tract. If the harm to the groundwater 
is remedial or abatable, the damage may be 
classified as "temporary" which limits the 
recovery to the rental value of the land for 
the period in which it was incapable of use 
or the cost of restoring the groundwater.
See, Dobbs, Remedies § 5. 1 (West 1973).
Maxedon v. Texaco Producing. Inc., 710 F. 
Supp. 1306 (W.D. Kan. 1989), illustrates
that the traditional theory of damages for 
groundwater pollution may be changing due to 
the prevalent environmental ethic. There, 
plaintiff landowners filed suit against the 
defendant oil and gas lease operator for 
pollution of their land caused by saltwater 
leaking from improperly plugged and abandoned 
wells and saltwater spills. On the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the 
court initially held that the plaintiffs 
could not recover the cost of cleaning up the 
land when that amount exceeds the fair market 
value of the property before injury. Even 
though the court evidenced concern about 
pollution caused by oil and gas operations, 
as well as the public policy of requiring 
restoration of polluted land and water, the 
court refused to "legislate" and change the 
common law rule that damages cannot exceed 
the fair market value of the land before 
injury. Later, however, the court retracted 
that part of its opinion which held that 
temporary damages may not exceed the pre­
injury value of the damaged property. The 
court noted that the 10th Circuit in Miller 
v. Cudahy Co.. 858 F. 2d 1449 (10th Cir.
1988), affirmed an award of temporary damages 
which exceeded the potential recovery for 
permanent damages, i.e., the difference in 
the fair market value of the land before and 
after the injury. The award in Cudahy had 
calculated temporary damages as the loss of 
the value of the use of the property. The 
court noted its disagreement with that result
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but indicated that it was compelled to follow 
Cudahy and stated that if "temporary 
damages," i.e., damages for an injury that is 
"intermittent and occasional (when) the cause 
of damages (is) remediable, removable, or 
abatable," should be awarded at trial, the
The damages for injury to the land is 
essentially the same as for groundwater 
pollution.
b. Physical waste of oil, gas, or coal reserves.
Veazey v. Burton Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 59, 
72 O  &. G.R. 60 (La. App. 1981), involved a 
suit by a mineral owner against the operator 
to recover the value of petroleum 
hydrocarbons which were allegedly wasted from 
the leased premises due to the operator's 
negligent failure to properly plug an 
abandoned well. The facts indicate that 
plaintiff, the mineral owner, executed an oil 
and gas lease which was subsequently assigned 
to the defendant operator who drilled, in 
1966, an 18,000 foot well on the premises. 
Allegedly, two high-pressure gas zones were 
encountered, as indicated by the well logs, 
at 14, 675 feet and 14, 800 feet respectively, 
which was below the point at which the 
defendant set casing, at 13, 429 feet. As 
opposed to completing the well, the defendant 
abandoned and plugged the well. In plugging 
the well, defendant negligently failed to 
isolate and separately plug the gas zones as 
required for all "open reservoirs" of oil or 
gas by the applicable Louisiana well plugging 
regulations. Thereafter, the well logs were 
discovered by another operator who obtained 
an oil and gas lease from the plaintiff and 
drilled, in 1977, a dry hole on the premises. 
Plaintiff then sued the defendant for the 
value of the gas and condensate allegedly 
wasted from the gas reservoirs due to the 
negligent failure to properly plug the well. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to 
the defendant, which was affirmed by the 
Louisiana Appellate Court on the ground that
evidence may justify an award which would 
exceed the value of the land prior to the 
injury.
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c. Costs of properly plugging abandoned wells 
recovered by subsequent operator.
In Salmon Corp. v. Forest Oil Corp., 536 P. 2d 
909, 52 O  &. G.R. 413 (1974), the defendant 
operated seventy-one (71) oil wells producing 
from the Wayside sand in Osage County, Ok. 
When primary production declined, the 
defendant plugged the wells. Approximately 
four (4) years later, plaintiff obtained oil 
and gas leases on the land, and other lands, 
and instituted a secondary recovery 
waterflood operation. When the plaintiff, 
pursuant to his secondary recovery operation, 
injected water under pressure in the 
formation, an old well previously plugged by 
the defendant immediately commenced to purge 
water. Plaintiff re-entered and replugged 
the well. Plaintiff alleged that twenty-five 
(25) of the old wells plugged by the 
defendant were negligently or improperly 
plugged and adversely interfered with the 
waterflood operation and polluted the land. 
However, since it was impossible to establish 
if the remaining forty-six (46) wells were 
plugged in such a manner as to withstand the 
pressure from the injected water, plaintiff 
plugged or replugged all of the wells 
previously operated by the defendant. 
Thereafter, plaintiff sued the defendant to 
recover the costs of plugging the wells. The 
defendant argued, inter alia, that the 
Oklahoma Well Plugging Act, Corporation 
Commission Act and Osage Indian Agency 
regulations did not require the wells to be 
plugged so as to avoid interference with 
future waterflood operations. By summary 
judgment, plaintiff was denied the right to
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the plaintiff's alleged damages were 
"speculative." To recover, the court held, 
plaintiff must prove with certainty that the 
oil and gas could have been produced in 1966 
from the alleged reservoirs, and that it was 
then economically feasible for the defendant 
operator to have done so. Likewise, the 
quantity of oil and gas which would have been 
produced and the value of the production to 
the plaintiff must be proved with certainty. 
Mr. Justice Laborde dissented. Cf. Elliff v. 
Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S. W. 2d 
558 (1948).
recover the costs of plugging the forty-six 
(46) wells which were not alleged to have 
been improperly plugged. Further, the trial 
court instructed the jury, inter alia, that 
"substantial compliance" with the well 
plugging statutes and Osage Indian 
regulations was the extent of the defendant's 
duty and such a finding would preclude a 
verdict for the plaintiff. The jury found 
for the defendant. On appeal, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case 
for retrial. First, the court held that 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the 
costs of plugging the allegedly improperly 
plugged wells if the defendant had failed to 
"strictly comply" with the applicable well 
plugging regulations and, additionally, if 
plugging the wells in compliance with the 
regulations would have "sealed off" the 
formation so that the plugged wells would 
have withstood the enhanced pressure 
occasioned by the waterflooding. Further, 
plaintiff would also be entitled to recover 
the plugging costs of the wells which had not 
been alleged to have been improperly plugged 
if a "reasonable prudent operator," under 
the circumstances, would have reentered and 
replugged the wells before continuing with 
the waterflood operation.
d. Cost of restoring the damaged formation.
See, Palmer Corp . v. Collins, supra, at 
VI(A) (3).
e. Punitive damages.
In Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co.. 576 P. 2d 317, 
60 O  &. G.R. 546 (Okla. App. 1977), 
plaintiff's land was polluted during a ten 
(10) year period by saltwater leaking and 
overflowing from pipelines and holding tanks. 
In addition to compensatory damages, 
plaintiff was awarded punitive damages in his 
suit. In affirming the punitive damages award 
on appeal, the Oklahoma intermediate 
appellate court emphasized that the 
defendants were aware of the poor condition 
of the tanks and pipes, since they continued 
to repair the leaks, and preferred to make 
post-spill repair rather than pre-pollution 
replacement of the dilapidated equipment.
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Such conduct evidenced a reckless and 
aggravating disregard for the rights of 
plaintiff and indifference regarding the 
fertility of the soil, justifying an award of 
punitive damages.
The impetus to avoid punitive damages in 
groundwater pollution litigation is 
illustrated by Marshall v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Co.. 874 F. 2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1989), an 
action involving the failure to properly plug 
an abandoned oil and gas well, wherein a jury 
verdict for $400,050 in compensatory damages 
and $5 million in punitive damages was 
affirmed on appeal.
5. Liability of operator who "abandons" the well, or
subsequent assignee or mineral owner.
a.  Liability is imposed on an operator who 
abandons the well.
Although the language of the statute 
expressly refers to the "owner of the well," 
who is required to give notice of the intent 
to abandon the well and, thus, by implication 
would seem to have the duty to plug the well, 
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987) may be 
construed as placing the obligation to plug 
the well on the "operator" who abandons the 
well. Because the operator is traditionally 
the party who obtains the drilling permit and 
posts the proof of financial responsibility 
pursuant to Rule B-7 to ensure the plugging 
of the well, the Commission's rules would 
also seem to indicate that the operator is 
the party responsible for the plugging of the 
well. Should this construction prevail, 
neither successors-in-interest of the 
operator who abandons the well, nor owners of 
non-operating working interests, would incur 
liability to the state or third parties for 
failure to plug a previously abandoned well.
Some support for that proposition exists. In 
Railroad Comm'n v. American Petrofina Co.,
576 S.W. 2d 658, 62 O  & G.R. 421 (Tex. Civ. 
Ap. 1978), the defendant acquired by 
assignment an oil and gas lease upon which 
was situated a producing gas well. Also 
situated upon the leased premises was an
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unplugged well which had been drilled under a 
previously terminated oil and gas lease. The 
well had been abandoned prior to the 
defendant's acquisition of its assignment.
The then applicable Texas Well Plugging Act, 
Tex. Nat. Resources Code Ann. § 89. 002(A)(2) 
(1978), imposed the obligation to plug the 
well on the "operator," defined as "a person 
who is responsible for physical operation and 
control of a well at the time the well is 
about to be abandoned or ceases operation." 
The Texas Railroad Commission ordered the 
defendant to plug the abandoned well. The 
trial court reversed the Order of the 
Railroad Commission. In affirming the trial 
court's judgment, the Court of Civil Appeals 
emphasized that the defendant, not having 
abandoned the well, was not the "operator" 
pursuant to the statute.
b.  Liability is imposed on subsequent assignee.
Houser v. Brown. 29 Ohio. App. 3d 358, 505 
N.E. 2d 1021, 94 O  &. G.R. 344 (1986), 
involved a construction of the Ohio Well 
Plugging Act, R.C. 1509. 01(K), which provides 
that "the owner," i.e., "the person who has 
the right to drill *** and to appropriate the 
oil or gas that he produces *** is the person 
responsible for plugging a well that is or 
becomes incapable of producing oil or gas in 
commercial quantities." There, the inspector 
of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources 
discovered five (5) nonproducing unplugged 
wells on land owned by Sharon Herold during 
an "on site" inspection. The evidence 
indicated that the wells had not produced 
since 1973 and from that time the Department 
had been aware of their "dormant" condition. 
At the time of the "on site" inspection, the 
leases were then owned by the defendant Brown 
who had acquired the leases by assignment in 
1979. The Chief of the Division of Oil and 
Gas (Chief) ordered Brown to plug the wells. 
However, Brown had already released his 
interest in the leases to the landowner 
Herold. When the Chief found out that Brown 
had already cancelled his leases, he ordered 
Herold, the landowner, to plug the wells.
Both Brown and Herold appealed the orders to 
the Board of Review who reversed the order as 
to Brown, finding that he was not the "owner"
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when the Chief found the wells were incapable 
of producing, and affirmed the order as to 
Herold, finding that she was the "owner" when 
the wells were found to be incapable of 
producing. The decision reversing the order 
as to Brown was appealed to the Court of 
Common Pleas which affirmed the Board's 
reversal of the Brown order on the grounds 
that the "owner" of the wells for purposes of 
the Well Plugging Act was the "owner" at the 
time of the issuance of the Order to plug.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the 
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
Brown, the assignee to the nonproducing wells 
in 1979 had a duty, pursuant to the statute, 
to plug the wells. Thus, a new lessee or new 
owner may "inherit" the duty to plug a well 
if a well incapable of producing in 
commercial quantities is leased. The court 
noted that language of the statute, the 
policy requiring the plugging of unproductive 
wells, and the realities of the oil business 
justify this result. Many wells, the court 
noted, were drilled at the turn of the 
century, and many of the companies who 
drilled these wells are now out of business; 
thus, holding only the original owner 
responsible for the plugging of the wells 
would defeat the purpose of the statute. 
Further, the obligation to plug the well was 
a continuing duty, and once Brown acquired 
the duty, he could not escape it by releasing 
the leases prior to the issuance of the order 
to plug the wells.
c.  Liability of nonoperating working interest 
owner.
In 1983, the Texas Well Plugging Act was 
amended to provide that in the event the 
operator could not be found or no longer was 
in existence or lacked the assets to properly 
plug the well, the nonoperator, defined as 
working interest owners, exclusive of royalty 
and overriding royalty interests, had the 
duty to plug the well. In Railroad Comm'n v. 
Olin Corp., 690 S.W. 2d 628, 88 0. &. G.R. 579 
(Tex. App. 1985) a working interest owner, 
pursuant to a joint operating agreement, 
elected to go "non-consent," i.e., to be 
"carried" with a right to receive their
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proportionate share of production after costs 
plus a risk factor penalty had been recovered 
from their share of production, to a proposal 
by the operator to rework the well. 
Subsequently, the operator, unsuccessful in 
his reworking efforts, failed to plug the 
well. When the operator could not be 
located, or lacked the assets to plug the 
well, the nonoperating working interest owner 
was held to be obligated to plug the well.
d.  Liability of the mineral owner.
In Houser v. Brown, supra, Chief of the 
Division of Oil and Gas (Chief) ordered the 
landowner, apparently the mineral owner, 
pursuant to the Ohio Well Plugging Act, to 
plug the abandoned and unplugged wells. For 
a recitation of the facts, including the 
statute, see VI(A)(5)(b). On Appeal, the 
Board of Review affirmed the Chief's Order, 
finding that the mineral owner was the 
"owner" when the wells were found to be 
incapable of producing. The mineral owner 
failed to appeal the decision of the Board of 
Review. On the ultimate appeal of the 
Chief's Order to Brown, the assignee of the 
lessee who abandoned the wells without 
plugging, who had also been ordered to plug 
the wells, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted 
that the Chief had correctly issued the order 
to plug the wells to the mineral owner who, 
according to the court, also had a statutory 
duty to the public to plug the wells.
B. Common law remedies.
For a discussion of the common law remedies of 
trespass, negligence, nuisance and the doctrine of 
correlative rights, see, Douglass, The Obligation of 
Lessees and Others to Plug and Abandon Oil and Gas 
Wells, 25th Oil & Gas Inst. 123 (Matthew Bender 1974).
VI. The "Orphan Well" Problem and the "Well Plugging Fund"
A. Orphan wells are wells which have or will be abandoned 
without being plugged. 1
1.  The United States currently has 452,589 "stripper 
wells, " i. e., "wells producing ten (10) barrels or 
less of oil a day. " Interstate Oil Compact
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Commission, National Stripper Well Survey 4 
(1990). Many of these wells are unbonded, and may 
be abandoned in the future by operators lacking 
assets to plug. Arkansas has 7, 428 stripper wells 
which average 2. 42 BPD. National Stripper Well 
Survey, supra. at 4.
2. Thousands of previously abandoned and unplugged 
wells exist in the oil and gas producing regions 
of the United States. Most of the unplugged wells 
appear to be a legacy of the era of unregulated 
production of oil and gas. Today's comprehensive 
regulation typically involves "cradle to the 
grave" regulation of oil and gas wells, i.e., from 
permitting the drilling to requiring the plugging 
of the well, with a bond required as a condition 
to the issuance of the drilling permit to secure 
the eventual plugging of the well. Drilling 
permits, plugging permits and the bonding 
requirements typically were adopted as a part of 
the general conservation acts which regulated well 
spacing and pooling. Prior to the adoption of the 
general conservation acts, well plugging acts, 
such as Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), merely 
provided a cause of action for third parties 
harmed by the failure to properly plug the well. 
The statute failed to authorize the state to 
enforce the Act. As a result, many wells were not 
plugged when abandoned.
3. The statutory solution: the well plugging fund.
One common solution has been a "well plugging 
fund" which receives monies, either from 
forfeiture of bonds or fines, or from legislative 
appropriations which are available to the 
conservation agency for the plugging of any 
abandoned wells. Arkansas receives an 
appropriation, currently amounting to $100,000, 
from the legislature for funding of its well 
plugging fund. The plugging of any such well by 
the Commission should not relieve the operator of 
any civil liability pursuant to § 15-72-216.
B. Managing the orphan well problem.
1.  Problems associated with orphan wells.
Location of old abandoned and unplugged oil and 
gas wells is a primary problem. No state records 
of well locations existed during the pre­
conservation act era. As to wells drilled before
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the 1950's, individuals with knowledge of the 
unplugged well may no longer be living. The vast 
number of orphan wells and the costs required to 
plug old unplugged wells indicate that the state 
cannot afford to plug all the existing unplugged 
wells. The costs of plugging older unplugged 
wells may exceed the costs of plugging presently 
abandoned wells because some wells will have to be 
re-drilled in order to be properly plugged. 
Appropriations of funds from the legislature 
sufficient to plug all of the orphan wells which 
may pose a problem is unlikely to happen.
2. A strategy for orphan wells.
Locating orphan wells which have the highest 
potential for groundwater pollution would seem to 
maximize the benefit of the limited funds 
available to be expended on plugging orphan wells. 
First, searches for unplugged wells should be 
limited to geographic areas where groundwater is 
the principal source, or potentially the principal 
source, of water for domestic use. Additionally, 
the extent of oil field operations conducted in 
the area should also be a factor, as well as the 
existence of salt water disposal or secondary 
recovery operations, and any evidence of 
pollution, such as surface damages or enhanced 
mineralization of fresh water.
VIII. State Regulation of Salt Water Disposal Wells and
Enhanced Oil Recovery Wells: The Safe Water Drinking 
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300(F) et seq. (West 1982)
A. The statutory basis for the state regulation of Class
II wells (salt water disposal and enhanced oil recovery 
wells).
1. Pursuant to § 300 h-1, a state may obtain primary 
enforcement responsibility of the "underground 
injection control program" by obtaining approval 
of a state administered program which meets the 
EPA mandated "minimum requirements for effective 
programs" to prevent underground injection of 
fluids which "may result in the presence in 
underground water which supplies or can reasonably 
be expected to supply any public water system" of 
any contaminant which may result in a violation of 
the "national primary drinking water regulations" 
or may "otherwise adversely affect the health of 
persons." § 300h(d)(1,2). Arkansas has obtained 
"primacy" and, thus, administers the state's
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"underground injection control program" applicable 
to Class II wells.
2. Section § 300h-l(c)(1, 2) exempts from the mandated 
Underground Injection Control Program oil and gas 
salt water disposal wells and enhanced recovery 
wells "unless *** essential to assure that 
underground sources of drinking water will not be 
endangered by such injection."
B. Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission regulations applicable
to Class II wells, Rule C-7, Rule C-8 and Rule C-9.
1. Plugging and abandoning regulations.
The method of plugging prescribed by Rule B-8 is 
applicable to salt water disposal wells, pursuant 
to Rule C-7(E)(4); fluid repressure and waterflood 
wells, pursuant to Rule C-8(D)(3); and, gas 
repressure wells, pursuant to Rule C-9(D)(3).
2. Permitting requirements for Class II wells 
relating to "orphan wells. "
Applicants for class II wells must identify the 
location of all "oil and gas wells including 
abandoned and drilling wells and dry holes" within 
one-half (1/2) mile of the location of the 
injection well. All such wells which were 
improperly plugged or abandoned may require a plan 
of corrective action to prevent drinking water 
contamination. If the corrective action plan is 
deemed inadequate, the Commission may require 
either revision or substitution of another plan, 
or deny the permit. See, Rule C-7(D)(2)(a)(b), as 
to salt water disposal wells; Rule C-8(C)(2)(b), 
as to fluid repressure and waterflood wells; and, 
Rule C-9(C)(2), as to gas repressure wells.
3. Proof of financial responsibility.
Applicants for class II wells must satisfy the 
Commission of their financial responsibility to 
plug the well as a condition to issuance of the 
permit. In lieu of evidence of financial 
responsibility, the applicant may post a $100,000 
surety bond. See, Rule C-7(A)(3), as to salt 
water disposal wells; Rule C-8(C)(2)(k), as to 
fluid repressure and waterflood wells; and, Rule 
C-9(C)(2)(k), as to gas repressure wells.
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C. Civil and criminal penalties for violation of the 
regulations.
1. Civil penalties.
A fine of not more than $2500 a day for each 
violation may be incurred for violation of any 
Commission rule, including rule B-8, infra, which 
prescribes the method of plugging abandoned wells 
for class II wells. Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-103(a) 
(1987).
2. Criminal penalties.
Imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or 
a fine of not more than $5000, or both, in lieu of 
the civil penalty, shall be imposed for a 
"willful" evasion or violation of any requirement 
of the Safe Water Drinking Act. Ark. Code Ann. § 
15-72-104 (1987).
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